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Abstract 
The implications of status preference in a simple open economy model will be investigated in 
this paper. The open economy is modeled as a continuum of identical representative agents 
who have preferences over consumption and status. In the paper status is identified as 
relative wealth, which takes the form of relative holdings international financial assets. A 
symmetric macroeconomic equilibrium is derived in which status is the source of transitional 
dynamics for consumption and the current account balance. This result illustrates another 
way to generate transitional dynamics in the small open economy model, which, as is well-
known, does not have well-defined dynamics under perfect capital mobility. The role of status 
plays in influencing the open economy's adjustment to various macroeconomic shocks is 
also considered. 
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1. Introduction
An individual's utility is usually stated in terms of absolute of goods and services. This
standard speci¯cation is intuitively appealing and adequate to study many economic
problems. There is evidence, however, some of which is provided by Easterlin (1974,
1995) to indicate that an individual's economic well being depends on his position, or
status, in society, along with his absolute consumption, income, or wealth. The idea that
individuals are motivated by status considerations is a very old one in economics and
can be traced back to thinkers such as David Hume (1978) and Thorstein Veblen (1899).
The purpose of this paper is to consider the in°uence of status-preference in a small open
economy model.
While authors such as Frank (1985) have modelled the in°uence of status-preference in
a static setting, there are an increasing number of researchers who study status-preference
in a dynamic macroeconomic or endogenous growth context. These include Gal¶³ (1994),
Corneo and Jeanne (1997), Rauscher (1997), Futagami and Shibata (1998), and Fisher
and Hof (2000). Their work illustrates two ways in which status can be modelled in
a macroeconomic setting. The approach adopted by Gal¶³ (1994), Rauscher (1997) and
Fisher and Hof (2000) speci¯es that status-preference derives from relative consumption.
In contrast, Corneo and Jeanne (1997) and Futagami and Shibata (1998) represent status-
preference as arising from relative wealth, which these researchers measure in terms of
physical capital. In this paper we will also identify status as relative wealth, but will model
it in terms of international assets rather than in terms of physical capital.1 Furthermore,
while all these authors model the role of status-preference in a closed economy context, we
will, as indicated, consider this question in an open economy framework. We believe this is
an important extension of this line of research due to the increasing integration of the world
economy and the greater role of international assets in wealth accumulation. Our work
1It is sometimes argued that because it is easier to \see" relative consumption compared to relative
wealth, the former is more appropriate way to model status. With, however, employee stock-options
plans becoming more widespread, it may be easier to observe relative wealth than was previously the
case.
is, in addition, related to the recent Spirit of Capitalism literature, which is exempli¯ed
by authors such as Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992), Zou (1994, 1998) and Bakshi
and Chen (1996), who seek to explain growth, savings, and asset pricing behavior. This
research, based on the ideas of Max Weber (1958), views the wealth accumulation as
the means to achieving social status, which itself enables agents to acquire goods that
are regarded as \prizes" by society at large. These models can then be interpreted as
reduced-form versions of explicit microeconomic models in which agents contend to gain
such goods.
A further motivation for our approach is to o®er an alternative solution to a long-
standing issue in open economy macroeconomics: the fact that the small open economy
under the assumption of perfect capital mobility does not have a well-de¯ned transitional
dynamic equilibrium. This arises because if the small open economy can borrow or lend
at the given world interest rate, it must be the case that the domestic rate of time
preference equals the world interest rate in order for the economy to attain an interior
equilibrium.2 This, in turn, which rules out the possibility of well-de¯ned transitional
dynamics, since this relationship also ¯xes a given stock of physical capital or assets.
Turnovsky (1997) discusses several ways in which transitional dynamics can be restored
in the small open economy, representative agent context.3 One approach that has been
extensively used, see, for instance, Brock (1988), Sen and Turnovsky (1989a, 1989b, 1990),
and Frenkel, Razin, and Yuen (1996), is to incorporate into the small open economy model
a convex installation cost function for investment demand. While the equality between
the domestic rate of time preference and the world interest rate must still be imposed in
this framework, the domestic capital stock (and output) will adjust sluggishly to maintain
the equality between the rates of return of domestic and foreign assets. The adjustment
cost approach is, nevertheless, not without its critics, who point out that it is di±cult to
2If, on the other hand, the small open economy rate of time preference exceeds the world interest
rate, then agents eventually mortgage all of their capital and labor income. In contrast, the most patient
country acquires over time the wealth of all other countries. See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), chapter
3 for a discussion of these counterfactual cases.
3See Turnovsky (1997), chapters 2 and 3. He also points out that this issue does not arise in the
overlapping generations framework of which the Blanchard (1985) model is an in¯nite horizon variant.
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reconcile covariance properties of postwar U.S. data with those of macroeconomic models
that incorporate plausible values of the adjustment cost parameter.4
Another, though more controversial, approach to restoring transitional dynamics in the
small open economy model is to specify that agents possess Uzawa-type, time-dependent,
endogenous rates of time preference. Authors such as Blanchard and Fischer (1989),
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), and Turnovsky (1997) ¯nd this formulation intuitively
unappealing, however, because a necessary condition in the in¯nite horizon context to
generate saddlepoint dynamics is that the rate of time preference increases with the level
of consumption. Obstfeld (1990), drawing on the work of Epstein (1987), among others,
o®ers a defense of this approach and points out its usefulness in relaxing the assumption
of time-additive preferences, which is also restrictive.
Two additional, and related, approaches to addressing this issue are to incorporate
costs of holding foreign bonds and to specify an upward-sloping supply curve of debt. Both
approaches attempt to model, in a certainty equivalent framework, the macroeconomic
implications of imperfect substitutability between domestic and foreign assets. The ¯rst
approach was taken by Turnovsky (1985), while the second has been adopted by authors
such as Bhandari, Haque, and Turnovsky (1990). Using these speci¯cations, interior so-
lutions are obtained without imposing equality between the rate of time preference and
the world interest rate. Because asset stocks will, as a consequence, adjust slowly ac-
cording to international arbitrage, economies that incorporate these speci¯cations exhibit
transitional dynamics. One issue that arises in these two cases is the fact that the exis-
tence of transitional or degenerate dynamics often depends on the macroeconomic shock
in question.5 In addition, it can be argued that it is better to model the implications
of international capital market imperfections, which depend, in part, on the risk charac-
teristics of domestic and foreign assets, in an explicitly stochastic setting. In this paper,
we will show that our speci¯cation of status-preference leads to a transitional dynamic
4This is point is made by Kydland and Prescott (1982).
5Fisher (1995) and Fisher and Terrell (2000) show that the upward-sloping debt speci¯cation is useful,
however, in calculating the implications of world interest rate disturbances.
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equilibrium and argue that it generates, at least in our simple framework, more sensi-
ble predictions concerning the comparative dynamic response to selected macroeconomic
shocks than do some of the other approaches discussed here.6
In order to concentrate on the in°uence of status-preference, we will adopt a very
simple open economy speci¯cation. We will assume that agents receive a given endowment
of real income, consume a single real good tradeable at a unitary world price, and lend
(or borrow) at an exogenously determined world interest rate.7 Using an intertemporal
optimizing, perfect-foresight framework, we will derive a symmetric equilibrium in which
identical agents act in the same way. We will show that the open economy's transitional
dynamics arise from agents' preference for relative wealth. That is, our formulation of
status-preference results in an \e®ective" domestic rate of return that is endogenously
determined outside of steady state equilibrium. This, in turn, results in transitional
dynamics for consumption and the current account balance. We will also incorporate a
public sector into our model in order to determine how the open economy with status-
preference responds to ¯scal and initial public debt shocks. Overall, we will consider
income (endowment), government expenditure, initial public debt, and world interest
rate shocks.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section, section 2, describes the
model and derives the symmetric, intertemporal equilibrium. Section 3 calculates the
e®ects of income (endowment), government expenditure, initial public debt, and world
interest rate shocks on the intertemporal dynamics of the small open economy. In this
section we will employ phase diagrams to describe the transitional adjustment of con-
sumption and national debt in response to these macroeconomic disturbances. We close
in section 4 with concluding remarks and some suggestions for future work. A brief
mathematical appendix is also included.
6Since, as we will describe below, output is ¯xed in our model, our results will not be directly compa-
rable to those derived from the speci¯cation that uses an installation cost of investment function.
7See Obstfeld and Rogo®, chapters 1 and 2, for a recent exposition of the small open economy endow-
ment model.
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2. The Model and Intertemporal Equilibrium
We begin by assuming that there are a large number of representative agents, each of
whom has the following preferences over own consumption, c, and status, s, which we
identify with relative wealth, a=A
U = U(c; s) = U(c; a=A) (1a)
where a is individual wealth and A is aggregate, or average, wealth and all variables in
the model are denominated in real terms.8 We further specify that (1a) is increasing in
both consumption and status and strictly concave:
Uc > 0; Us > 0; Ucc < 0; Uss < 0; UccUss ¡ U2cs > 0. (1b)
In order to focus on the in°uence of status-preference, we make simple assumptions re-
garding the open economy's technological and ¯nancial market possibilities. Speci¯cally,
we assume that the agent receives a given endowment of income, denoted by ¹y, which is
traded internationally at a ¯xed, unitary world price. In addition, we specify that agents
can lend (or borrow) at the exogenously given world interest rate, equal to r¤, and can ac-
cumulate wealth in the form of domestic government bonds or international assets, which
are perfect substitutes.9 (The domestic public sector will be introduced below.) Employ-
ing an in¯nite horizon, perfect foresight framework, the agent's maximization problem is
formulated as follows
max
Z 1
0
U(c; s)e¡½tdt (2a)
8We will assume that the economy achieves an interior solution in which c > 0, a=A > 0, a > 0, A > 0.
The conditions under which this holds will be derived below. This formulation rules out the possibility
that private agents are net debtors. See, however, Hof and Wirl (2001), who analyze this case.
9For a variable x, ¹x denotes a non-policy variable ¯xed at a constant level, while _x indicates that its
time derivative is being taken. The partial derivatives of functions will be denoted by subscripts. Note
that in general we suppress a variable's time dependence.
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subject to
_a = r¤a+ ¹y ¡ c¡ ¿; a(0) = a0 > 0 (2b)
where ½ is the exogenous rate of pure time preference, ¿ is the given level of lump-
sum taxes, and a0 is the agent's initial endowment of wealth. Solving this optimization
problem, we obtain the following ¯rst order conditions for the representative agent:
Uc (c; a=A) = ¸ (3a)
_¸ = (½¡ r¤)¸¡ A¡1Us (c; a=A) (3b)
lim
t!1¸ae
¡½t = 0: (3c)
where ¸ the current costate variable. Equation (3a) is the necessary condition for con-
sumption, while (3b) describes the evolution of the shadow value if individual asset ac-
cumulation is chosen optimally. In performing the maximization, the agent ignores the
e®ect of his choice of a on A. Observe that the evolution of ¸ depends not only on indi-
vidual and aggregate asset stocks, but also on the agent's attitude toward status, which is
embodied in the partial derivative Us(c; a=A). Note also that equation (3c) represents the
transversality condition that constrains the dynamics of private sector asset accumulation.
The next step is to derive the intertemporal macroeconomic equilibrium. Following
the standard procedure for this type of problem, we assume that each individual acts in
the same way and normalize the population of agents to unity. This implies a = A and
results in the following symmetric private sector equilibrium:
Uc (c; 1) = ¸; c = c(¸); c¸ = 1=Ucc < 0 (4a)
_¸ = (½¡ r¤)¸¡ a¡1Us [c (¸) ; 1] (4b)
_a = ra+ ¹y ¡ c(¸)¡ ¿ (4c)
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together with the transversality condition (3c).10
We now incorporate the domestic public sector into the equilibrium and state the
following °ow budget constraint
_b = r¤b+ g ¡ ¿ (5a)
where b is the stock of government debt, g represents government spending, and, as
indicated above, ¿ is the level of lump-sum taxes. The government can borrow from the
domestic private sector or from abroad at the prevailing world interest rate r¤. We further
assume that the accumulation of government debt is subject to the following No-Ponzi
condition:
lim
t!1 be
¡r¤t = 0: (5b)
To obtain the overall macroeconomic equilibrium, we introduce the variable z ´ b¡a,
which is equal to the economy's net (or national) indebtedness. This is done in order
to permit the small open economy as a whole be a net debtor, while, at the same time,
maintaining our assumption that the private sector is a net creditor, which we believe to
be a realistic situation. Subtracting (2a) from (5a), we obtain the following expression
for the accumulation of net debt, which is equal to the (negative) of the current account
balance:
_z = r¤z + c(¸) + g ¡ ¹y: (6)
Substituting for z in equation (4b), we can state the open economy's equilibrium dynamics
as
_¸ = (½¡ r¤)¸¡ (b¡ z)¡1 Us [c(¸); 1] (7a)
_z = r¤z + c(¸) + g ¡ ¹y (7b)
_b = r¤b+ g ¡ ¿ (7c)
where the expressions for _z and _b are repeated for expositional purposes. In order to sim-
10For the remainder of the paper, lower-case variables will refer to their economy-wide aggregates.
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plify further the economy's dynamic structure, we assume that the ¯scal policy authorities
maintain a continuously balanced budget, i.e.,
_b = 0; ¿ = g + r¤¹b; 8t ¸ 0 (8)
where b(t) ´ ¹b is the constant stock of government debt, which we can identify, without
loss of generality, with its exogenous initial stock, b0. Under this ¯scal policy rule, the
dynamics of the open economy collapse to equations (7a, b), with b replaced by b0 in (7a),
and the private sector transversality condition (3c).
As an aid to intuition, it is useful to rewrite the equilibrium dynamics in terms of the
control variable, c, consumption. To do so, we take the time derivative of (3a), evaluated
in the symmetric equilibrium, equate the resulting expression to (7a), and divide by (3a).
This procedure results in the following Euler equation for _c
_c = ¾e (c) c
"
r¤ + (b0 ¡ z)¡1 Us(c; 1)
Uc (c; 1)
¡ ½
#
= ¾e (c) c [re(r¤; b0; z; c)¡ ½] (9a)
where
¾e (c) = ¡ Uc(c; 1)
cUcc(c; 1)
; re(r¤; b0; z; c) = r¤ + (b0 ¡ z)¡1 Us(c; 1)
Uc(c; 1)
(9b)
are, respectively, the e®ective intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ¾e (c), and the
e®ective domestic, or internal, rate of return on assets, re(r¤; b0; z; c). Observe that the
e®ective rate of return is equal to the sum of the world interest rate and the marginal rate
of substitution between status and consumption in the symmetric equilibrium. The latter
term represents the additional gain received by domestic agents due to status-preference.
Moreover, because status takes the form of relative wealth in our framework, the rate
of return re is not ¯xed parametrically, which will imply that the small open economy
has (potentially) saddlepoint stable transitional dynamics. To see this, assume, instead,
that agents have standard concave preferences solely over own consumption, so that (1a)
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equals U = U(c); U 0 > 0, U 00 < 0. The Euler equation (9a) then collapses to
_c = ¾(c)c [r¤ ¡ ½] (10)
where ¾(c) = ¡U 0=cU 00 is the standard elasticity of substitution. Since r¤ and ½ are both
¯xed constants, the equation (10) implies that r¤ = ½ must hold in order for the open
economy to reach a stable, interior equilibrium. As we discussed in the introduction, this
means that the small open economy exhibits no transitional dynamics, since _c = _z = 0 for
all t ¸ 0 in this case. We would also obtain this result if status corresponded to relative
consumption rather than to relative wealth, i.e., if (1a) were speci¯ed as U = U(c; s) =
U(c; c=C), where C would represent aggregate, or average, consumption.11 With this
formulation, the only the static levels of consumption and its marginal utility would be
a®ected by status-preference.12
In moving to a characterization of the economy's dynamic and equilibrium proper-
ties, it is convenient to introduce the following constant elasticity parameterization of
preferences:13
U(c; s) =
1
1¡ ®
h
(c1¡±s±)1¡® ¡ 1
i
; s = a=A; ® > 0; 0 < ± < 1. (11)
Using this speci¯cation of preferences, the Euler equation (9a) becomes
_c =
c
± + ®(1¡ ±)
"
r¤ + (b0 ¡ z)¡1 ±c
1¡ ± ¡ ½
#
(12a)
where the e®ective intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the e®ective rate of return
11See, however, the model of Fisher and Hof (2000) in which relative consumption does in°uence
equilibrium dynamics in a closed economy, endogenous growth context.
12The static marginal utility is derived from the relative consumption version of equation (3a), which
is given by Uc(c; 1) + c¡1Us(c; 1) = ¸ in the symmetric equilibrium.
13The partial derivatives of (11) are stated in the appendix. Using these expressions, we can show
that (11) satis¯es the curvature conditions we imposed on U(c; s) in (1b).
9
on assets are, respectively, equal to:
¾e = [± + ®(1¡ ±)]¡1 , re(r¤; b0; z; c) = r¤ + (b0 ¡ z)¡1 ±c
1¡ ± . (12b)
Clearly, both ¾e and re depend on the parameter ±, which represents the private sector's
attitude toward status in equation (11). It is straightforward to show that an increase
in ± raises (resp. lowers) ¾e if ® > 1 (resp. ® < 1) and that a rise in ± increases re. In
addition, because both higher levels of consumption and national debt raise the marginal
rate of substitution between status and consumption, both changes (in partial equilibrium)
increase the e®ective rate of return.14 Letting _c = _z = 0 in equations (7b) and (12b), we
can calculate the following parameterized steady state solutions for consumption, national
debt, and the e®ective rate of return
~c =
(1¡ ±)(½¡ r¤)(¹y ¡ g ¡ r¤b0)
(1¡ ±)½¡ r¤ (13a)
~z =
¡±(¹y ¡ g) + (1¡ ±)(½¡ r¤)b0
(1¡ ±)½¡ r¤ (13b)
~re = ½ (13c)
where ~x denotes the steady state value of a variable x. Using the de¯nition ~a ´ b0 ¡ ~z,
the long-run solution for the private sector's asset position is, in turn, given by:
~a =
±(¹y ¡ g ¡ r¤b0)
(1¡ ±)½¡ r¤ . (13d)
In order to guarantee an interior solution for steady state consumption and private sector
asset holdings, we assume (¹y ¡ g ¡ r¤b0) > 0 and [(1¡ ±) ½¡ r¤] > 0. The ¯rst condition
requires that the (¯xed) level of output exceed government expenditure plus interest
service on the inherited stock of public debt, while the second restricts the values that the
14Consequently, the positive relationship in our model between the e®ective rate of return and the
stock of national debt arises from status-preference rather than from capital market imperfections. In
addition, a rise in the world interest rate leads to a one-for-one increase in the e®ective rate of return,
while an increase in the initial stock of government debt lowers re in partial equilibrium.
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status parameter ± can take.15 Since 0 < ± < 1, observe that the second condition is also
su±cient for ½ > r¤, and will be, as we will show, a necessary condition for the existence
of a saddlepoint equilibrium for the linearized versions of (7b) and (12a). Equations
(13a, d), show that ~c and ~a are larger the greater is (¯xed) output, net of government
expenditure and public sector interest service. Noting the numerator of (13b), the steady
state solution for ~z, national debt, can be either positive or negative. It is clear that the
greater is the initial stock of public debt, b0, the larger is the level of national indebtedness,
while the opposite is the case, the greater is the level of (¯xed) output net of government
expenditure, (¹y ¡ g). For expositional purposes, we will assume subsequently that the
small open economy is a net debtor in steady state equilibrium, i.e., ~z > 0.16 Finally,
equation (13d) states that the long-run value of the e®ective rate of return is pinned-down
by the exogenous rate of time preference.
Taking ¯rst-order approximations of (7b) and (12a) around the steady state solutions
(13a, b), we derive the following matrix di®erential equation
0B@ _c
_z
1CA =
0B@ µ11 µ12
1 r¤
1CA
0B@ c¡ ~c
z ¡ ~z
1CA (14a)
where
µ11 =
½¡ r¤
± + ®(1¡ ±) > 0; µ12 =
(1¡ ±)(½¡ r¤)2
± [± + ®(1¡ ±)] > 0. (14b)
The stability properties of this system are determined by the signs of the trace and
15The ¯rst condition can be rewritten as b0 < (¹y ¡ g) =r¤, which says that the initial stock of public
debt cannot exceed the present discounted value of output net of government expenditure. We can also
show that the second condition is equivalent to the restriction that ± not exceed the ratio (½ ¡ r¤) =½.
16Using equation (13b), the condition for ~z > 0 is:
b0 >
±(¹y ¡ g)
(1 ¡ ±)(½ ¡ r¤) .
In addition, it is easy to show by di®erentiating (13b) with respect to ± that ~z declines the higher is the
status parameter ±.
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determinant of the coe±cient matrix of (14). These are given, respectively, by
¹1 + ¹2 = µ11 + r
¤ > 0; ¹1¹2 = µ11r¤ ¡ µ12 (15)
where ¹1, ¹2 are the corresponding eigenvalues of the dynamic system. For the equilibrium
of (14a) to be a saddlepoint, ¹1¹2 must be negative. Using the expressions for the matrix
elements µ11, µ12 in (14b), we can show that the determinant of the coe±cient matrix of
(14b) equals:
¹1¹2 = ¡¾e ¢ (½¡ r
¤) [(1¡ ±)½¡ r¤]
±
=
¡(½¡ r¤) [(1¡ ±)½¡ r¤]
± [± + ®(1¡ ±)] : (16)
Since this expression is negative under our assumption [(1¡ ±) ½¡ r¤] > 0, the equilibrium
of (14a) is a saddlepoint, with ¹1 < 0, ¹2 > 0, j ¹1 j< ¹2. Using standard methods, we can
then obtain the following solutions for consumption and national debt along the stable
saddlepath:
c = ~c+ (r¤ ¡ ¹1)(~z ¡ z0)e¹1t = ~c+ µ12
µ11 ¡ ¹1 (~z ¡ z0)e
¹1t (17a)
z = ~z ¡ (~z ¡ z0)e¹1t (17b)
where z adjusts from an exogenous initial stock, z0.
17 Combining the solutions (17a, b),
we obtain the saddlepath that describes the stable co-movements of consumption and net
debt
(c¡ ~c) = ¡(r¤ ¡ ¹1)(z ¡ ~z) = ¡µ12
µ11 ¡ ¹1 (z ¡ ~z). (17c)
The graph of this locus has a negative slope, so that consumption and national debt adjust
in opposite directions along the saddlepath, i.e., sgn ( _c) = ¡sgn ( _z). We can now derive
the phase diagram, illustrated by Figure 1, of equation (14a). Using equations (7b) and
(12a), the _c = 0 and _z = 0 loci are described, respectively, by:
c =
1¡ ±
±
(½¡ r¤)(b0 ¡ z) (18a)
17Because ¹1 is an eigenvalue of coe±cient matrix of (14a), (r
¤ ¡ ¹1) = µ12=(µ11 ¡ ¹1).
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c = ¡r¤z + ¹y ¡ g. (18b)
The _c = 0 locus has a negative slope that depends on the size of the status parameter
±. For instance, the greater weight the private sector attaches to status, i.e., the greater
is ±, the °atter is the _c = 0. The _z = 0 locus, in contrast, is independent of consumer
preferences and has a slope equal to ¡r¤. Note from the ¯rst equality of (17c) that
the slope of _z = 0 is smaller in absolute value than that of the stable saddlepath. The
intersection of the _c = 0 and _z = 0 loci is illustrated by point A in Figure 1 and determines
the steady state values of ~c and ~z.
We can also use the solutions for consumption and national debt to solve for the path
of the e®ective rate of return, re. First, we linearize the parameterized expression for the
e®ective rate of return, equation (12b), about its steady state value of ½. This yields:
re = ½+
±
(1¡ ±)(b0 ¡ ~z)
"
(c¡ ~c)¡ ~c
(b0 ¡ ~z)(z ¡ ~z)
#
. (19a)
Substituting the second equality of (17a) and the solution for z given in (17b) into (19a),
we obtain the following expression for the path of re:
re = ½+
±
(1¡ ±)(b0 ¡ ~z)
"
µ12
µ11 ¡ ¹1 ¡
~c
(b0 ¡ ~z)
#
(~z ¡ z0) e¹1t: (19b)
This solution can be simpli¯ed by substituting for µ11, µ12 and using the fact that
~c
(b0 ¡ ~z) =
~c
~a
=
(1¡ ±)(½¡ r¤)
±
(19c)
where the latter expression is calculated using equations (13a, d).18 Making these substi-
tutions in (19b) and evaluating the resulting expression, we can show the stable solution
for the e®ective rate of return equals:
re = ½+
(½¡ r¤)¹1
~a(µ11 ¡ ¹1) (~z ¡ z0) e
¹1t. (19d)
18Observe that the ratio ~c=~a is a negative function of the status parameter ±.
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The solution for re states that if z0 < ~z (resp. z0 > ~z), then r
e < ½ (resp. re > ½)
along the stable saddle path. Consequently, it is the case that sgn ( _re)=sgn ( _z) during
the transition to steady state equilibrium.
3. Comparative Dynamics
In this section we will describe the dynamic response of consumption and national debt
in the small open economy to the following permanent shocks: income (endowment),
government expenditure, initial public debt, and world interest rate shocks. To calculate
the steady state e®ects of these disturbances, we employ the steady solutions, equations
(13a, b), derived in the previous section.19 The transitional response of the small economy
will be calculated using stable saddlepath solutions given above in equations (17a, b) and
will be illustrated with diagrams based on Figure 1.20
3.1. Income Shocks
An increase in the economy's endowment of income has the following steady state impact
on consumption and national debt:
d~c
d¹y
= ¡d~c
dg
=
(1¡ ±)(½¡ r¤)
(1¡ ±)½¡ r¤ > 1 (20a)
d~z
d¹y
= ¡d~z
dg
= ¡ ±
(1¡ ±)½¡ r¤ < 0: (20b)
In response to the rise in ¹y, consumption increases and national debt declines in long-run
equilibrium.21 In terms of Figure 2a, this corresponds to a shift in the _z = 0 locus to the
right, which results in a new intersection with the _c = 0 locus at point C. Observe from
(20a) that the rise in ¹y increases ~c more than proportionately. In other words, income
19The changes in the long-run stock of private sector assets ~a are calculated using the identity a ´ b0¡z.
20The shocks are, therefore, permanent unanticipated shocks.
21Note from equations (13) that this disturbance is equivalent to a decrease in government expenditure.
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(and government expenditure) shocks have a multiplier e®ect on steady state consumption
in our model of status-preference. This result is easily explained using Figure 2a. Using
the ¯rst equality of (17a), the initial response of consumption equals:22
dc(0)
d¹y
= ¡dc(0)
dg
= 1 +
±¹1
(1¡ ±) ½¡ r¤ < 1. (21)
In terms of Figure 2a, this corresponds to an initial jump in c(0) to point B, which
lies on the saddle path corresponding to the new steady state equilibrium at point C.
From equation (21), it is evident that since the rise in consumption at t = 0 is less
than the increase in income, this disturbance also raises private savings. This re°ects the
fact that status|in the form of relative wealth|and own consumption are both normal
goods in this economy. Consequently, the private sector accumulates assets, which, in
the symmetric equilibrium, leads to an improvement in the economy's aggregate asset
position that corresponds to a decline in z.23 It is this long-run decline in the economy's
net indebtedness that permits steady state consumption to rise by more than the rise
in income. In Figure 2a, this process is depicted by the adjustment of net debt and
consumption along the new stable locus from point B to point C in which _z < 0, _c > 0.
These results stand in sharp contrast to those that would obtain if consumer preferences
were a function solely of own consumption, i.e., if U = U(c), or if status depended on
relative consumption rather than on relative wealth, i.e., if U = U(c; c=C). Because
the Euler relationship in both of these cases collapses to equation (10), there are no
transitional dynamics subsequent to the increase in ¹y, only an immediate one-for-one
increase in consumption with no change in the equilibrium stock of national debt.
We can also describe impact of this shock on the e®ective rate of return, re. Using
the solution for re given above in (18d), we can show that the initial response of e®ective
22Using the second equality of (17a), it is straightforward to show that the initial increase in c(0) is
unambiguously positive.
23Indeed, the long-run response of consumption and net debt are greater, the larger is the status
parameter ±. In terms of Figure 2a, a larger value of ± corresponds to a \°atter" _c = 0 locus. This
produces, in turn, greater changes in ~c and ~z for a given shift in the _z = 0 locus.
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return equals:
dre(0)
d¹y
=
±
(1¡ ±) ~a
dc(0)
d¹y
= ¡ ±(½¡ r
¤)¹1
[(1¡ ±) ½¡ r¤] (µ11 ¡ ¹1) > 0. (22)
Thus, the e®ective rate of return initially rises subsequent to the increase in ¹y. This
re°ects the fact that initial jump in consumption raises the marginal rate of substitution
between status and consumption. After t = 0, the e®ective rate of return then declines,
(along with national debt), toward its steady state value of ½.
We are now in a position to ask how the response of the economy to the income
shock would di®er if, instead, agents possessed Uzawa-type preferences, leaving the rest
of the economic structure unchanged.24 We can show that in response to an increase
in ¹y that the long-run stock of debt ~z rises, while the steady state level of consumption
~c is unchanged. This is brought about by an initial increase in consumption that exceeds
the rise in income. Agents with Uzawa-type preferences then dissave during the entire
transition to the steady state equilibrium, which raises ~z and brings consumption back
to its original, pre-shock level. If, on the other hand, the economy is characterized by
an upward-sloping debt function and preferences depend solely on own consumption,
then we can show that consumption immediately rises one-for-one with the increase in
¹y.25 Since there are no transitional dynamics in this case, the stock of national debt
is completely una®ected by the income shock.26 In our view, the dynamic response of
24With time dependent preferences, equation (2a) becomes
max
Z 1
0
U(c)e
¡
R t
0
¯(s)ds
dt
where ¯(s) = ¯ [U(c)], ¯0(U) > 0, ¯00(U) > 0, ¯(U) ¡ U(c)¯0(U) > 0. The assumption ¯0(U) > 0 is
required for the economy to have saddlepoint dynamics. In addition, our subsequent discussion applies
equally well to the case of ¯scal shocks.
25In the context of our model, the upward-sloping debt function would be equal to:
r(z) = r¤ + Ã(z), Ã0 > 0, Ã00 > 0:
We can also show that the results for the model in which there are costs to adjusting foreign bonds are
qualitatively similar to those derived in the upward-sloping debt function approach.
26As indicated in the introduction, world interest rate shocks will, however, lead to transitional dynamic
responses for c and z.
16
the small open economy under our speci¯cation of status-preference is more plausible,
compared to these alternative approaches, because the burden of long-run adjustment
falls on both consumption and national debt.
3.2. Fiscal Shocks
For expositional purposes, we next include a phase diagram, Figure 2b, that illustrates
the adjustment of the economy subsequent to a permanent, balanced-budget increase in
government expenditure. The adjustment of the economy in this case is, thus, the mirror
image of that depicted in Figure 2a. In Figure 2b the _z = 0 locus shifts to the left. This
results in a new intersection with the _c = 0 locus at point C 0, which involves a greater
steady state stock of national debt and a lower steady state level of consumption. We infer
from equation (20a) that the long-run fall in consumption exceeds the rise in government
expenditure. This is due to the fact that agents also reduce asset holdings during the
transitional phase. Combined with the increase in lump-sum taxation to support the
higher level of g, this results in proportionately fewer resources for consumption in the
long-run. Equally, however, this result, which arises from the status-preferring behavior
of agents, implies that the fall in initial consumption from point A0 to point B0 is less
than the rise in government expenditure.27
3.3. Government Debt Shocks
We turn now to an analysis of the e®ects of an increase in the inherited stock of government
debt, b0. This is a negative wealth e®ect from the perspective of the private sector. In
this case, it is the _c = 0 locus that shifts to the right, while the _z = 0 locus remains in its
original position. This results in a new steady state equilibrium at point E in Figure 2c,
which is associated with a higher stock of national debt and a lower level of consumption.
The fall in ~c is a consequence of the increase in lump-sum taxes required to ¯nance the
27Using equation (22), it is clear that the increase in g causes a fall in re. The e®ective rate of return
subsequently approaches its long-run value of ½ from below.
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higher stock of b0 and a reduction in private sector asset income. From equations (13a,
b), the expressions for the changes in ~c and ~z are given by:
d~c
db0
= ¡(1¡ ±) (½¡ r
¤)r¤
(1¡ ±)½¡ r¤ < 0 (23a)
d~z
db0
=
(1¡ ±) (½¡ r¤)
(1¡ ±)½¡ r¤ > 1: (23b)
Observe from (23b) that a rise in the initial stock of public debt increases the stock
of national debt ~z more than proportionately. Ultimately, this is because agents treat
relative wealth as a normal good in the utility function. This is re°ected in the fact that
the private sector reduces its net asset position during the transition to the new steady
state equilibrium. Using the identity a ´ b0 ¡ z and equation (23b), we can further show
that fall in private sector asset holdings equals:
d~a
db0
= ¡ ±r
¤
(1¡ ±)½¡ r¤ < 0. (23c)
In addition, we can show, using the ¯rst equality of (17a), that initial private sector
dissaving is su±ciently great so that c(0) rises to a point such as D. The expression for
the change in c(0) is equal to
dc(0)
db0
=
d~c
db0
+ (r¤ ¡ ¹1) d~z
db0
= ¡¹1 d~z
db0
> 0 (24)
where we have used equations (23) to obtain the last equality of (24).28 This means that
the new stable locus in Figure 2c lies to the right of its original position, implying that
consumption is greater than ~c0|its value before the increase in b0|during the ¯rst phase
of its adjustment toward the new steady state equilibrium at E. It is this initial dissaving
on the part of the private sector that causes ~z to increase by more than the rise in b0.
28According to the solution for the e®ective rate of return in equation (19d), the increase in b0 causes
an initial decline in re. Thus, the direct negative e®ect of the rise in b0 on re is stronger than the positive
e®ect of the increase in c(0) on re.
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3.4. World Interest Shocks
Finally, we consider the dynamic impact of an increase in the world interest rate, r¤.
Unlike the long-run e®ects of the domestic shocks, a rise in the world interest rate has
an ambiguous impact on the steady state values of consumption and national debt. Dif-
ferentiating equations (13a, b) with respect to r¤, we obtain the following expressions for
the changes in ~c and ~z:
d~c
dr¤
=
(1¡ ±)
[(1¡ ±) ½¡ r¤]2 f±½ (¹y ¡ g ¡ r
¤b0)¡ (½¡ r¤) [(1¡ ±)½¡ r¤] b0g (25a)
d~z
dr¤
=
¡± [¹y ¡ g ¡ (1¡ ±)½b0]
[(1¡ ±)½¡ r¤]2 . (25b)
The restrictions we imposed earlier to guarantee ~c > 0, ~a > 0, are insu±cient to sign the
expressions (25a, b). Nevertheless, two cases can be identi¯ed that depend on the relative
shifts in the _c = 0 and _z = 0 loci. It is straightforward to show that the rise in r¤ causes
both the _c = 0 locus and the _z = 0 to shift to the left.29 In the ¯rst case, depicted in
Figures 2d, the horizontal shift in the _c = 0 locus exceeds that of the _z = 0 locus and
results in a new equilibrium, illustrated at point G, that corresponds to a higher value of
~c and a lower value of ~z.30 In contrast, the horizontal shift in the _z = 0 locus exceeds
that of the _c = 0 locus in Figure 2e, which implies that long-run consumption|along
with national debt|falls. The new long-run equilibrium in this case is illustrated by
point I. In both instances consumption falls at t = 0 before rising along the new saddle
paths.31 This is depicted in Figure 2d by the movement from point F to point G and in
Figure 2e by the movement from point H to point I. Intuitively, the di®erence between
29Evaluated in the steady state equilibrium, the horizontal shifts in the _c = 0 and _z = 0 loci are given
by ¡(b0 ¡ ~z)=(½ ¡ r¤) and ¡~z=r¤, respectively. We can show that the shift in the _c = 0 locus exceeds
(resp. is less than) the shift in _z = 0 locus as b0 exceeds (resp. is less than) ½~z=r¤.
30This result would unambiguously obtain if, instead, the economy possessed the Uzawa-type prefer-
ences discussed above. This is due to the fact that since the rate of time preference depends positively on
consumption, it must be the case that ~c increases if r¤ rises. For the upward-sloping debt speci¯cation,
we can show that while the response of ~c to the increase in r¤ can either be positive or negative, the stock
of national debt unambiguously declines.
31Even though initial consumption falls, the direct e®ect of a higher world interest rate will increase
the e®ective, domestic rate of return re.
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the two cases is that in the ¯rst case, Figure 2d, the accumulation of private sector assets
and, thus, interest income, is su±ciently great to allow for a higher level of long-run
consumption, while in the second case, Figure 2e, this e®ect is insu±ciently strong. In
general, the impact of higher asset income will be greater the larger is (¯xed) output net
of government expenditure, (¹y ¡ g), and the smaller is the inherited stock of government
debt, b0. Finally, we can identify the case, illustrated in Figure 2f, in which a rise in r
¤
leads to an increase in national debt as well as to a decline in consumption. As in Figure
2e, the horizontal shift in the _z = 0 locus exceeds that of the _c = 0 locus. The shift in the
_z = 0 locus is, however, su±ciently great in Figure 2f so that the new point of intersection
now corresponds to point I 0, which involves both higher ~z and lower ~c. In this case, agents
decumulate assets along the saddlepath H 0I 0, due to the relatively large increase in lump-
sum taxes required to support the rise in public sector debt service. This is caused by the
fact that the economy inherits in this case a relatively large stock of government debt, b0,
compared to the level of (¯xed) output net of government expenditure, (¹y¡g).32 Observe
also that due to the dissaving associated with this case, the fall in consumption at t = 0
to point H 0 is less than its steady state decline at point I 0.
4. Conclusions and Extensions
The goal of this paper is to study the implications for status, modelled as relative wealth,
in a small open economy framework. In order to focus on the role of status-preference, we
selected a simple one-good model in which output was ¯xed and agents could lend (and
borrow) at the given world interest rate. We derived a symmetric dynamic equilibrium in
which status-preference was the source of transitional dynamics. This is the case, because
our speci¯cation results in an e®ective domestic rate of return that is endogenously deter-
32Using equation (25b), the condition that the rise in r¤increases ~z to given by:
b0 >
(¹y ¡ g)
(1 ¡ ±)½ .
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mined outside of long-run equilibrium. Our approach thus o®ers an alternative method
of generating transitional dynamics in a small open economy framework with perfect cap-
ital mobility. The in°uence of status was investigated in considering four macroeconomic
shocks: income (endowment), government expenditure, initial public debt, and world
interest rate shocks. The notable results we derived were that income and government
expenditure shocks have a multiplier e®ect on the steady state level of consumption, while
initial public debt shocks cause the long-run stock of national debt to respond more than
proportionately. Such multiplier e®ects arise because agents with a preference for relative
wealth respond to macroeconomic disturbances by adjusting both consumption and as-
set accumulation, which tends to magnify the long-run impact of these disturbances. In
contrast, we showed that world interest rate disturbances have, in general, an ambiguous
e®ect on the steady state values of consumption and national debt, although we were able
to distinguish several cases.
Since the present structure of the model is quite simple, many extensions are pos-
sible. One obvious extension is to allow agents to accumulate physical capital as well
as ¯nancial assets. Not only would this introduce investment and output dynamics into
the small open economy framework, but would also imply that status-preference would
depend on the relative holdings of physical capital as well as on relative ¯nancial wealth.
The preference weights agents place on the two forms of relative wealth would then in-
°uence the overall structure of asset accumulation and growth in the open economy. The
production structure can be further modi¯ed by permitting an endogenous employment
decision. This would extend the work of Hof (1999), who has studied the issue of labor
supply and status in a closed economy context. Another avenue in which our model can
be extended is in its goods structure. In the present speci¯cation, agents consume a single
traded good at a ¯xed unitary price. One possible modi¯cation is to assume that agents
consume nontraded as well as traded goods and that status, for example, depends on the
relative consumption of imported goods. This may be particularly relevant in studying the
role of status in developing economies in which goods that generate status are imported
from abroad. Finally, the issue of the optimal public policy response to status-preference
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can be explored. The question would be to investigate whether status-preference leads
to distortions in the decentralized equilibrium and then to calculate the optimal taxes or
subsidies that would reproduce the ¯rst-best, or social, optimum.
5. Appendix
We state here the ¯rst and second partial derivatives of the constant elasticity utility
function, equation (11), used to derive the parameterized solution of the model:
Uc(c; s) = (1¡ ±)c¡®(1¡±)¡±s±(1¡®) > 0; Us(c; 1) = ±c(1¡±)(1¡®)s±(1¡®)¡1 > 0
Ucc(c; s) = ¡(1¡ ±) [± + ®(1¡ ±)] c¡®(1¡±)¡(1+±)s±(1¡®) < 0
Uss(c; s) = ¡± [1¡ ±(1¡ ®)] c(1¡®)(1¡±)s±(1¡®)¡2 < 0
Usc(c; s) = ±(1¡ ±)(1¡ ®)c¡®(1¡±)¡±s±(1¡®)¡1. (A1)
Using the expressions for Ucc, Uss, and Usc, we show that strict concavity, UccUss¡U2cs > 0,
holds. With the expressions for Uc, Ucc, and Us evaluated in the symmetric equilibrium in
which s = 1, we calculate the relationships in (12b) describing the e®ective intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, ¾e, and the e®ective rate of return, re.
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